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ABSTRACT
Despite the importance of leases in the US economy, and the existence of several theoret-
ical lease pricing models, there has been little systematic attempt to estimate these models.
This paper proposes a simple no-arbitrage based lease pricing model, and estimates it using a
large proprietary data set of leases on several property types. We also deﬁne a new measure,
the Option-Adjusted Lease Spread, or OALS (analogous to an option’s implied volatility,
or a mortgage-backed security’s Option-Adjusted Spread), that allows us to compare leases
with diﬀerent maturities and contract terms on a consistent basis. We ﬁnd sizeable pricing
errors that cannot be explained using interest rates, lease maturity, or information on the
options embedded in the contracts. This suggests either that there are signiﬁcant mispric-
ings in the market for real estate leases, or that lease terms depend heavily on unobservable,
property-speciﬁc characteristics.
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Leases are one of the most important ﬁnancing sources for US corporations.1 They are in
many ways very similar to corporate bonds. Both are contracts in which one party promises
to make set payments to another over some period of time. In both cases, the period of the
payments may be long or short, the payments may be ﬁxed or adjust over time according
to some rule, and the contracts may or may not contain option-like features. In the case of
corporate bonds, the most common options are the options to default, to call the bond (i.e.
to repurchase it at some ﬁxed price), and to convert it to a ﬁxed share of the ﬁrm’s equity. In
the case of lease contracts, there is again a default option, there may be cancellation options
(eﬀectively making the lease callable), and there are often also various equity-like features
in which future payments are tied to economic variables such as sales or CPI growth.
Despite the importance of these markets to the US economy, and the recent explosion
of both theoretical and empirical research into the valuation of corporate debt (see Duﬃe
and Singleton (2003) for a summary), leases have remained relatively under-studied. There
have been many theoretical advances in lease pricing, including Miller and Upton (1976),
Brennan and Kraus (1982), McConnell and Schallheim (1983), Schallheim and McConnell
(1985), Grenadier (1995), and Grenadier (2005), and there is empirical support for some of
these models’ predictions. For example, Schwartz and Torous (2004) ﬁnd that oﬃce building
construction in 34 metropolitan areas agrees with many of the predictions in the strategic
development model of Grenadier (2002). However, there has been little empirical testing
of these models’ pricing implications.2 The research that does exist typically regresses the
current period’s lease payment on various possible explanatory variables to see what factors
aﬀect lease rates [see, for example, Glascock, Jahanian and Sirmans (1990), Benjamin, Boyle
and Sirmans (1992), Wheaton and Torto (1994), Webb and Fisher (1996), and Mooradian
and Yang (2000)]. It is hard, however, to interpret the regression coeﬃcients obtained, since
the value of a lease depends not just on its current payment amount, but also on how fast
those payments will grow over time, what options there are to renew or cancel the lease, and
on the lease’s maturity. Gunnelin and S¨ oderberg (2003) and Englund, Gunnelin, Hoesli and
1Although the exact value of the outstanding stock of commercial and manufacturing real estate leases
in the U.S. is not known, the economic value of these positions can be approximated through the value
of non-residential, non-agricultural structures in the United States. At the end of year 2005, the Federal
Reserve, Flow of Funds, B100-B103, reports the value of non residential commercial real estate to be $9.9
trillion dollars. (Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds, L.220). The 2005 Census of Manufacturing reports
that building rents account for 14.5% of the total capital expenditures of manufacturing ﬁrms (U.S. Census
Bureau, Annual Survey of Manufacturers, Table 3, Supplemental Statistics for the United States and States:
2005).
2Ambrose et al. (2002), Hendershott and Ward (2003) and Clapham and Gunnelin (2003) develop and
simulate valuation models. However, they do not explicitly estimate or test their models using market data.
1S¨ oderberg (2004) use regressions to estimate linear term structures of lease rates. However,
their data set of Swedish leases does not contain many of the options commonly found in
U.S. leases.3
There are several reasons why leases have not received as much attention as bonds,
despite the close similarities between them. One major reason is the lack of available data.
While bond prices are available both on their issue date and subsequently, very little pricing
information on leases is available. In general, all we can observe are the terms of the lease,
and the fact that both landlord and tenant were willing to sign the contract on a particular
date. Not only do we not generally observe the market’s assessment of the present value
of the future payments due on the lease,4 but, even if we did, this would not be enough to
test a pricing model, since leases diﬀer from bonds in one very fundamental respect. With a
bond, the borrower receives a ﬁxed amount of money in exchange for a promise to make the
contractual payments on the bond. There is no argument over how much that ﬁxed amount
of money is worth. In contrast, in exchange for making lease payments, the lessee obtains
use of the underlying asset (e.g. 1,000 square feet of retail space, or a two year old 747 jet) for
some speciﬁed period of time. We cannot decide whether a lease is correctly priced merely
by valuing its payments. We also need to take into account the value of what is obtained in
exchange for those payments, something that is often not easily observable.
Another diﬀerence between leases and bonds is that leases are substantially more hetero-
geneous in their terms. Fixed rate bonds diﬀer from each other in maturity, callability, etc.,
but they have only a few diﬀerent patterns of cash ﬂows — coupon payments of some ﬁxed
size, made at some ﬁxed interval, with some terminal payment at maturity. By contrast,
in addition to having a much wider variety of embedded options, the scheduled payments
on lease contracts diﬀer widely from one lease to another. For example, Figure 1 shows the
monthly contractual rent per square foot for leases in light industrial properties in Phoenix,
AR (the ﬁgure shows only those contracts that contractually speciﬁed adjustments). It can
clearly be seen that there is a wide range of payment schedules, even without considering all
of the embedded options in these leases.
This paper develops a no-arbitrage based lease valuation model following Brennan and
Kraus (1982), and performs a systematic empirical test of the model. In the process, we
also deﬁne a new lease valuation measure that allows us to compare two leases with diﬀerent
3 There is also some empirical research looking at non-real estate leases. For example, Giaccotto et al.
(2007) analyze a large sample of automobile leases to estimate the value of the lease-end purchase option
typically embedded in such leases. Empirical analyses of the yields and default behavior on non-real estate
leases include Lease et al. (1990) and Schallheim et al. (1987).
4There has been increasing capital market interest in directly securitizing leases. Recent examples of this
include the securitization of the World Trade Center Lease in New York in 2001, and the securitization of
the J.P. Morgan Chase Building in San Francisco, 2002.
2terms on a consistent basis. To calculate this measure, we start by explicitly calculating
the present value of the service ﬂows obtained in exchange for the promised lease payments.
From this we subtract the present value of the lease payments, which gives us the model’s
estimate of the NPV of the lease. Finally, we annualize this measure, obtaining the lease’s
“Option-Adjusted Lease Spread” (OALS). This measure, analogous to the Option Adjusted
Spread (OAS) of a mortgage-backed security, can be consistently compared across leases
with diﬀerent maturities.
We are able to estimate the values of unobservable parameters (such as the market price
of lease risk) by considering multiple leases on the same property or in the same city. Since
both parties are willing to sign the lease contract at initiation, on that date its OALS (and
NPV) ought to be zero in a competitive market. If the model ﬁts perfectly, and we have
observed all relevant information, the OALS we calculate ought therefore to be zero for all
leases. If we obtain values that are not all zero,
1. Comparing the model’s OALS for each lease with various characteristics of the leases
and underlying properties, we should be able to learn something about what character-
istics are important, and in turn what this tells us about how the underlying valuation
model can be improved.
2. The extent to which the OALS cannot be explained by observable characteristics is
a measure of either important unobservable characteristics, model misspecifcation or
mispricing.5 We cannot at this point determine which, but we can see how important
a question this is for future researchers to investigate.
Besides allowing the model to be calibrated, the OALS is important because it is a single
summary statistic that can be consistently compared across diﬀerent leases, regardless of
their maturities, contractual payment amounts, and embedded options.6 In this light, the
OALS measure can be interpreted as a lease counterpart to an option’s implied volatility.
In the options literature, the ﬁrst use made of the Black and Scholes (1973) model was as
a serious description of option prices, and several authors performed empirical tests of the
model [see, for example, Rubinstein (1985)]. However, as the model’s shortcomings became
clear, and as more realistic, but more complex, alternative models were developed, the Black
and Scholes (1973) model has nevertheless retained its usefulness as a simple way of allowing
us to compare prices for options with diﬀerent maturities and strike prices. Our model
5 Examples of these unobservable characteristics include both property characteristics (e.g., view, access,
location, and tenant mix) and tenant characteristics (such as credit quality).
6 It is important to note that OALS is independent of the size of a lease, so, just as with IRR, it may not
be a good way to compare two leases of very diﬀerent sizes.
3allows us to do the same for leases, summarizing all of the characteristics of a lease and its
underlying asset in a single measure, the model’s OALS.
In our empirical analysis, we use a proprietary data set of seven hundred and eleven
leases from properties located in 11 states. The leases are a subset of a portfolio of leases
assembled by the lead underwriter for a $559,155,971 commercial mortgage pool consisting
of 132 ﬁxed-rate, ﬁrst lien mortgage loans. For each of the 47 properties in our sample we
have detailed information about the contract structure of the leases, including the base rent
levels, the treatment of expense pass-throughs, the renewal options, the reset periods and
level of rent changes, the percentage options, and the maturities on the contracts. We also
have detailed information about the local submarket, tenant mix, mortgage contract, and
a recent appraisal for each of the properties. There is considerable variability in the leases
which provides a unique opportunity to analyze the cross-sectional variation in lease contract
structures across locations and properties.
The next section presents the model, outlining our assumptions about service ﬂows,
building value, the term structure of lease rates and how these concepts can be combined
into a lease valuation model that is empirically tractable. The following section discusses
our data set development, and estimates the model. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The Model
We develop a simple contingent-claims model for valuing leases with a wide range of possible
terms and embedded options, as a function of the instantaneous spot lease rate. This rate is
taken as exogenously speciﬁed, as in Brennan and Kraus (1982), McConnell and Schallheim
(1983) and Schallheim and McConnell (1985). We use no-arbitrage arguments to derive a
partial diﬀerential equation for the lease value in terms of the underlying state variable.7
Suppose the spot lease rate (equivalently, the instantaneous service ﬂow) from a new
building, Xt, follows a geometric Brownian motion process,
dXt/Xt = µx dt + σx dZt. (1)
Write the value of an asset whose payoﬀs depend on Xt (and possibly time) as V (x,t), where
x is the current value of Xt. By Ito’s Lemma, we can write
dV (x,t)
V (x,t)
= m(x,t)dt + s(r,t)dZ, (2)
7 Although we derive the model using no-arbitrage arguments, it could also be derived from equilibrium
considerations, as in, for example, Goetzmann et al. (2003) (see also Merton (1976) and Ingersoll (2006)).
4where
m(x,t)V = Vt + µxxVx +
1
2
σ
2
xx
2Vxx, (3)
s(x,t)V = σxxVx. (4)
This equation holds for any asset V . Since everything is driven by a single factor, the
instantaneous returns on all assets depending on only Xt and t must be perfectly correlated.
As a result, to prevent arbitrage the risk premium on any asset must be proportional to
the standard deviation of its return.8 Substituting for the asset’s standard deviation from
Equation (4), if the asset pays out dividends at rate d, we can thus write
m = r −
d
V
+ q(x,t)xσx
Vx
V
, (5)
where q(x,t) is the price of risk. Substituting equation (5) into equation (3), assuming that
the price of risk is a constant,
q(x,t) ≡ λ/σx, (6)
yields a partial diﬀerential equation that must be satisﬁed by any contingent claim,
1
2
σ
2
xx
2Vxx + [µx − λ]xVx + Vt − rV + d = 0. (7)
Note that in the case where λ = µx − r, this equation reduces to the familiar Black and
Scholes (1973) option pricing equation. Equation (7) can be used to price any contract
whose payments depend on the instantaneous spot lease rate, including lease contracts with
assorted embedded options, by suitable choice of boundary conditions. For example, consider
the building itself. This is an inﬁnitely lived asset which pays out Xt at time t, but also
depreciates. If we assume a depreciation rate of δ, the building is paying an eﬀective dividend
at rate x − δV , so its value solves the equation
1
2
σ
2
xx
2Vxx + [µx − λ]xVx + Vt − rV + (x − δV ) = 0. (8)
The homogeneity of this problem implies that the solution must be a multiple of x, and it
is simple to verify that the solution is
A(x) =
x
(r + λ) − (µx − δ)
. (9)
8Suppose this did not hold for two risky assets. We could then create a riskless portfolio of these two
assets with a return strictly greater than r, leading to an arbitrage opportunity (see Ingersoll (1987)).
5This is just the standard perpetuity formula, where the expected return on the asset is r+λ,
and the cash ﬂows’ (expected) growth rate is µx − δ. The depreciation rate has the same
eﬀect as a reduction in the growth rate of the service ﬂows.
2.1 Term Structure of Lease Rates
The partial diﬀerential equation above can be used to determine the term structure of ﬁxed
lease rates for a given instantaneous lease rate. For a given maturity, T, it must be the case
that rolling over a sequence of instantaneous leases has the same present value as taking out
a single lease with a constant periodic payment over the same time interval.
Rolling over short term leases
Consider ﬁrst rolling over a sequence of instantaneous leases. The present value of the
remaining payments is the value of an asset which pays out a dividend at rate Xt, and has
value 0 at date T. It therefore solves the equation
1
2
σ
2
xx
2Vxx + [µx − λ]xVx + Vt − rV + x = 0, (10)
subject to the boundary condition that its value at maturity equals zero. It is simple to
verify that the solution to this equation is
V (x) =
x
(r + λ) − µx

1 − e
−{(r+λ)−µx}T
, (11)
where T is the remaining time to maturity. This is just a version of the familiar annuity
formula. Note that as T grows large, this converges to the result in Equation (9), with δ = 0.
Fixed Lease Payments
Now consider a long term lease with constant payment d per period. The present value of
the remaining payments is the value of an asset which pays out a dividend at (constant) rate
d, and has value 0 at date T. It therefore solves the equation
1
2
σ
2
xx
2Vxx + [µx − λ]xVx + Vt − rV + d = 0, (12)
subject to the boundary condition that its value at maturity equals zero. It is simple to
verify that the solution to this equation is
V (x) =
d
r

1 − e
−rT
, (13)
6where T is the remaining time to maturity. Since the values of the two leases must be the
same, we can immediately solve for the ratio of the long term to the instantaneous lease
rate,
d
x
=

r
r + λ − µx

1 − e−{(r+λ)−µx}T
1 − e−rT

. (14)
2.2 Lease NPV and Option-Adjusted Lease Spread (OALS)
The value of a lease depends not only on the payments, but also on the value of the service
ﬂow received from the underlying asset. Deﬁne the net present value (NPV) of the lease to
be the value of the service ﬂows from the underlying asset during the period of the lease,
less the value of the lease payments. Write l(x,t) for the contractual lease payment at time
t if the underlying spot lease rate is x, the lease’s NPV, L, is thus the value of an asset that
pays out
x − l(x,t)
each period. It thus satisﬁes the partial diﬀerential equation
1
2
σ
2
xx
2Lxx + [µx − λ]xLx + Lt − rL + x − l(x,t) = 0. (15)
At the lease’s ﬁnal expiration date, T, we have the boundary condition
L(x,T) = 0.
At any renewal option date, τ, the lease will be renewed only if doing so is preferable to
taking out a new lease (which always has NPV equal to zero). Thus, L must also satisfy the
boundary condition
L(x,τ) ≥ 0
at each renewal date. Solving equation (15) subject to these boundary conditions allows us to
calculate the NPV for any lease, taking into account any embedded options. Comparing the
NPVs of diﬀerent leases allows us, in principle, to see how well our model matches observed
lease prices, but the NPV has the disadvantage of being maturity dependent. Even if our
model is wrong, the NPV of a very short lease must be close to zero merely because there
is little time for any mispricing to have an eﬀect. This makes it hard to know immediately
what to conclude when comparing the NPVs of two leases with diﬀerent maturities. This
is very similar to the problem that arises when comparing the prices of bonds or options
with diﬀerent maturities. Since price automatically varies with maturity, how do you know
that any price diﬀerence you observe is not due entirely to the maturity diﬀerence? To solve
7this problem, it is customary to quote a transformed version of the price that removes the
maturity dependence. For bonds, traders usually talk about yield rather than price. For
options, traders often quote implied volatility. In the case of leases, we can deﬁne something
similar, the “Option-Adjusted Lease Spread”, or OALS. Consider the equation
1
2
σ
2
xx
2L
0
xx + [µx − λ]xL
0
x + L
0
t − rL
0 + x + s − l(x,t) = 0. (16)
This equation for L0(x,t,s) is the same as equation (15) for L, except that the payout has
been increased by a (constant) amount s. The OALS is the value of s that solves the equation
L
0(x,t,s) = 0,
when equation (16) is solved subject to the boundary conditions9
L
0(x,T,s) = 0,
L
0(x,τ,s) = 0, if L(x,τ) = 0.
This second boundary condition says that the lease’s termination behavior is determined by
the solution to equation (15). The OALS is an annualized version of the NPV, the (constant)
upward shift in the service ﬂow from the underlying asset required for the model to produce
an NPV of zero.10 Focusing on the OALS rather than the NPV removes the maturity
dependence of the NPV, but otherwise conveys the same information. In particular, the
OALS will be zero/positive/negative whenever the NPV is zero/positive/negative.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Lease Data
Summary statistics for the leases in our data set are reported in Table 1. The mean contract
maturity is 5.23 years, about 40% of the leases were written in 1995 and 1996, and the
earliest leases were written in 1987. The average appraised value of the properties was about
$5 million and the average monthly base rent in September 1997 was $11.02 per square
foot. Approximately 27.5 percent of the leases had renewal options, and the average number
of renewals for those leases that had renewals was one. The maximum number of renewal
9Note that there will always be exactly one solution to this equation, because L0 is an increasing function
of s, with L0 |s=−∞= −∞, and L0 |s=∞= ∞.
10 This is similar in spirit to the Option Adjusted Spread used in mortgage valuation models (see, for
example, Gabaix et al. (2007)).
8options was six. The average leased square footage was 3,858 and the range of leased square
footage varied from a maximum of 153,480 square feet and a minimum size of 120 square feet
for professional oﬃce suites. Only 6% of our tenants had percentage rents, and the breaks
for these rents were the ratio of the initial stabilized rent to the percentage rate. Nearly all
of the leases used expense pass-throughs as the cost sharing mechanism, so this lease feature
is not explicitly considered. We had information on the level of tenant improvements for
each lease. However, we do not know if it was the tenant or the landlord that paid for these
up-front expenses or how they were amortized over time. The mean tenant improvement
was $.22 a square foot, but most tenants did not receive tenant improvements.
We identiﬁed two types of lease renewal/cancellations in leases. We had leases in which
the renewals were exercisable at “market rents”. Fifteen percent of the leases had this type
of renewal. The second type of renewal option, present in about eleven percent of the sample,
was exercisable at an ex ante ﬁxed rent. This form of renewal option was usually, though
not exclusively, associated with the anchor tenants.
The usual tenant mix in the suburban malls is one large high volume merchandiser, or a
movie theater, as the anchor tenant, and small tenants that often include a video store, doc-
tors’ oﬃces, nail and beauty salons, book stores, and restaurants. The suburban oﬃce were
all low-rise buildings, and the tenants appear to be independent professionals, accounting
and law ﬁrms, travel agencies, insurance companies, restaurants, and some retail. The light
industrial properties were one story tilt-up construction, and the tenants are independent
professionals and light manufacturing ﬁrms such as software companies, tee shirt printers,
custom bicycle producers, and back-oﬃce ﬁnancial services uses. The average age of the
properties was 16.18 years and the average occupancy rate was 96.6%, ranging from fully
occupied buildings to a low of 82% occupancy. The physical condition of the properties was
excellent and 18.9% of the older properties had been recently renovated.
The lease documents indicated whether the tenant was an anchor; about 6% of the
tenants were anchors. The tenant data also included a marker for “credit” tenants. We
separately veriﬁed this credit evaluation by checking for a credit rating for the listed tenant.
The credit rating scheme we developed is intended to approximate the classiﬁcations used
by the Urban Land Institute in their publication Dollars and Cents of Shopping Centers but
with added information about credit worthiness. We classify a tenant as a National Credit
Tenant if we could ﬁnd an above investment grade bond rating for the ﬁrm. We classiﬁed
tenants as Regional Tenants if the tenant was part of a regional chain of, say, grocery stores
or restaurants. We classiﬁed tenants as Local Tenants otherwise. About 6% of our sample
was classiﬁed as National Credit Tenants and 87.7% were small local tenants.
We allow for a diﬀerent term structure of spot leases in each of the fourteen metropolitan
9areas in which the properties are located: Atlanta, Baltimore, Denver, Detroit, Fort Worth,
Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Madison, Orange, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Seattle, San Bernardino,
and San Jose. We use a metropolitan area speciﬁc rental price index from 1987 through 1997,
the National Real Estate Index obtained from Ernst and Young, to compute the standard
deviation of the percentage rent changes. Those computed values are reported in the sixth
column of Table 2.
3.2 Implementing the Model
To solve Equations (15) and (16) for a lease’s NPV and OALS, we use a binomial tree similar
to Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979). The model’s parameters are
σx The volatility of the spot lease rate,
µx The expected rate of increase of the spot lease rate,
λ The market price of lease risk,
r The riskless interest rate.
Given these parameters, plus an initial value for the spot lease rate, X0, we construct a
binomial tree describing the risk-neutral evolution of the spot lease rate, which can be
represented in continuous-time as
d b Xt/ b Xt = [µx − λ] dt + σx dZt. (17)
Note that, unlike the usual case when building a binomial tree of stock prices, the risk-neutral
drift of the lease rate is equal to (µx − λ) rather than the riskless rate, r. We match this
drift, plus the volatility of the spot lease rate, σx, by setting the probability of an upward
jump equal to
p =
e(µx−λ)τ − d
u − d
,
where τ is the time step in the tree, and u and d are the sizes of upward and downward
jumps respectively, deﬁned by11
u = e
(µx−λ)τ+σ
√
τ,
d = e
(µx−λ)τ−σ
√
τ.
Given this tree, we can now value any security whose payoﬀs depend on the lease rate by
discounting its payoﬀs back through the tree in the usual way. In the process, we can take
11This choice of up and down jumps guarantees that both p and 1 − p will be positive for any σx > 0.
10into account diﬀerent promised payment schedules, as well as any embedded options. Let Li
t
be the NPV of a lease contract to the tenant at time t in state i (where i counts the number
of up-movements in the tree since time 0). This must be zero at the lease’s maturity, since
the tenant neither receives any more services from the asset nor makes any further lease
payments. Prior to maturity, we value the lease recursively in the usual way. Assuming
the lease remains outstanding for another period, the value of the contract today equals its
discounted expected value next period, plus the service ﬂow from the underlying asset over
the next period, minus the contractual lease payment over the next period:
L
i
t =

pL
i+1
t+1 + (1 − p)L
i
t+1

/(1 + rδ) + X
i
tδ − C
i
t, (18)
where Xi
t is the spot lease rate at time t in state i, and Ci
t is the contractual lease payment.
If there is an option to cancel the contract at date τ, the option will be exercised only when
it is in the tenant’s best interests, i.e.,
L
i
τ = max

pL
i+1
τ+1 + (1 − p)L
i
τ+1

/(1 + rδ) + X
i
τδ − C
i
τ,0
	
. (19)
Repeated application of this recursion allows us to calculate the initial lease NPV, V 0
0 , and
the OALS, s is calculated by repeatedly doing the same valuation with Xi
t replaced by Xi
t +s
until we ﬁnd an NPV equal to zero.
3.3 Estimation
For any set of values for the parameters µx, λ and σx, and an initial spot lease rate, X0, we
can calculate the OALS for each lease, si. If our model captures every important feature
of the lease contract, and we have the correct values for all of the parameters, the initial
NPV and OALS for every lease ought to be zero. However, if factors not captured by the
model are important in determining lease contract terms, or if there is (random) mispricing
in the marketplace, they will show up as an NPV and OALS diﬀerent from zero.12 The
important point is that, unlike a single period’s contractual payment, the NPV or OALS
we have calculated can be compared across diﬀerent contracts, allowing us to explore the
determinants of lease contract terms without worrying about whether all we are seeing is
something related to the pattern of contractual cash ﬂows, rather than a true economic
relation between lease value and our explanatory variables.
In estimating the model, note that the parameters µx and λ appear in the valuation
12 One important factor not included in the model as written is a liquidity premium due to the illiquidity
of the lease contracts. However, a constant liquidity adjustment will not aﬀect our results at all; it will
appear empirically as part of the price of risk, λ.
11equation only in the form of their diﬀerence, µx−λ, so we need only to estimate this diﬀerence,
not the two parameters separately. We also need a value for r, the riskless interest rate. We
use the 10 year Treasury rate. σx, the volatility of lease rates, is estimated separately for
each city and each property type using the metropolitan rent series described above. We
also need the current value of the underlying spot lease rate, Xt. The true instantaneous
spot lease rate is not really observable, but we do have a rent series for each location, and
we assume that the spot lease rate is some constant multiple, α, of the number in the rent
series.13
We perform the estimation separately on each of fourteen metropolitan areas. Our es-
timation strategy is similar to that of Quigg (1993), who also used a valuation model and
observed market outcomes to back out the implied parameters of the model. Our observ-
ables are the base rent levels, the timing and base rent levels on the renewal options, and
the maturities on the leases. For each property class and metropolitan area, we estimate
the risk-adjusted growth rate of the spot lease rate, m ≡ µx − λ, and the ratio between the
prevailing contractual lease rate Rt and the unobserved underlying spot lease rate, α, by
nonlinear least squares, choosing the values that make the OALS’s for all leases of that type
and in that metropolitan area as close as possible to zero. Formally, let the OALS for lease
i be si(αRt,m;r,σx). Then the estimated values of α and m are given by
(b α, b m) = argmin
α,m
N X
i=1
s
2
i(αRt,m;r,σx),
where N is the number of leases of the given property type in the given metropolitan area.
Finally, some tenants are so-called “anchor tenants”. These are usually large tenants
whose presence in turn attracts both other tenants and customers for those tenants. Since
they increase proﬁt for other tenants, they also increase the amount of rent they are willing
to pay, and in general are able to negotiate more favorable terms for themselves as a con-
sequence. We assume this beneﬁt is proportional to the current spot lease rate, and value
anchor tenants’ leases by taking the same state variable as for a non-anchor tenant, then
scaling it by an additional (estimated) parameter that reﬂects this extra beneﬁt.
Estimation results are shown in Table 2. Columns two and three show the ﬁtted param-
eters for the metropolitan and property class–level multiple for the unobservable spot lease
rent. The multiples are positive and quite precisely estimated for most of the cities, except
for the smaller sample size cities such as Baltimore, Detroit, Madison, Fort Worth, and San
Jose. In contrast, the parameter estimates for the risk adjusted growth rates are highly vari-
13The homogeneity of the spot lease rate process implies that the values of many typical contracts will be
some multiple of the current spot lease rate.
12able and are quite imprecisely estimated for all of the subsamples as shown in columns four
and ﬁve of Table 2. The ﬁnal parameter, representing the anchor tenant’s beneﬁt multiple,
appears in columns seven and eight when anchor tenants were present in the metropolitan–
level property classes. These parameters are again quite precisely estimated for all but the
smallest samples, and suggest that anchor tenants command signiﬁcant discounts for positive
externalities.
It is not the model’s parameter estimates per se that are interesting, but rather what
they imply for lease values. To further consider the implications of our ﬁtted lease valuation
models by submarket, we follow the intuition of Grenadier (1995), and plot the implied term
structure of spot lease rates by property type and metropolitan area using the parameter
estimates and equation 14. Figure 2 shows the implied spot lease rate for light industrial
properties in four metropolitan areas: Baltimore, MD; Los Angeles and Orange, CA; and
Seattle, WA. Figure 3 shows the implied term structure of spot lease rates for suburban oﬃce
properties in three metropolitan areas: Phoenix, AZ and Los Angeles and Orange, CA. Fi-
nally, Figure 4 shows the results for retail properties in six metropolitan areas: Philadelphia,
PA; Los Angeles and Orange, CA; Atlanta, GA; Phoenix, AZ; and Denver, CO. These curves
represent the implied structure of forward rents as of September, 1997 in each case.
These plots highlight the variability in the shapes of the term structures across product
types and metropolitan real estate markets. Los Angeles has a steeply downward sloping spot
rent term structure in all three property types, whereas Orange has an upward sloping light
industrial term structure and a ﬂat term structure for retail and suburban oﬃce. The severe
California recession in the late nineties appears to have been a more signiﬁcant problem for
the Los Angeles market than for the Orange market with an economic base that is focused on
the port, its trucking hubs, and U.S. trade with Asia. Phoenix also has a strongly downward
sloped term structure for both suburban and retail leases perhaps reﬂecting the overbuilding
in the late nineties. In contrast, the Denver term structure is mildly upward sloping perhaps
reﬂecting the perceived strength of the technology sector that was located there. These plots
are again suggestive that our model is able to distinguish across metropolitan real estate
markets and that diﬀerences in economic fundamentals can be inferred from the parameters
of the lease contracting structures.
To further explore the variability in our estimated term structures, we regress the esti-
mated term structure slope by property-type on metro-level economic indicators. Summary
statistics for these indicators are reported in Table 3. As shown, the average slope is negative
across our metropolitan areas, and there is considerable variability in all of the measures.
The numbers of establishments in ﬁnance and insurance and in retail are intended as proxy
measures for oﬃce and retail space demand. Overall, the metro-level CPI growth indicates
13little inﬂation in September of 1997, and indicate deﬂation in Detroit with a CPI growth of
−.1%. There is also considerable variability in the unemployment rates across the metropoli-
tan areas, with a high of 6.9% in Detroit and elevated levels in most of the metro areas in the
Los Angeles basin. The ﬁnal measure is an indicator of the average household expenditures
on consumption, intended to proxy for diﬀerences in average income and purchasing activity
across the metropolitan areas.
Table 4 shows the results of regressing the estimated term structure slopes on the metro-
level economic indicators. The regression explains little of the overall variance in the slope
measures, with an R2 of .03. In addition, the F test on the null hypothesis that the coeﬃ-
cients are jointly zero is accepted at conventional levels of economic signiﬁcance. Despite the
low explanatory power of this regression (due to the small sample size), the metro-level un-
employment rate is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This result suggests
that the term structures are more steeply sloped in metropolitan areas with higher unem-
ployment rates (the correlation coeﬃcient between unemployment and slope is .32). This
weak unemployment rate channel and the important economic downturns caused by base
closures in California may explain a part of the steeply negatively sloped term structures we
have found in our results.
3.4 Analysis of OALS
Fitting the model gives us a set of parameters that prices the leases correctly on average. It
also provides an OALS measure that tells us how far each lease is from the model’s predic-
tions. We further evaluate the reasonableness of our model by regressing these OALS values
for each lease contract on a variety of lease contract and market indicators. In equilibrium,
if our model was correct, and if we had access to all information relevant to pricing the
leases, we would expect OALS to be zero for each lease contract. OALS values diﬀerent
from zero may reﬂect model misspeciﬁcation, (random) mispricing, or dependence on addi-
tional unobservable variables. To investigate this further, Table 5 performs a ﬁxed-eﬀects
regression of the OALS, and of the realized rent in September, 1997, on various possible
explanatory variables. The ﬁxed eﬀects controls are for properties, since many of the leases
are physically located in the same properties.14 Looking ﬁrst at the OALS results, we ﬁnd
that few of the individual coeﬃcients are individually signiﬁcant. However, the signiﬁcant
size coeﬃcients suggest that the lease pricing model does not provide adequate controls for
the rental concessions oﬀered to large square footage tenants with long lease maturities.
Since these tenants are often, but not always, the anchor tenants, this result indicates that
14We do not report the ﬁxed eﬀects parameters, although a χ2 test of joint insigniﬁcance was rejected at
the 1% level
14our simple shift parameter for the anchor tenants may not suﬃciently capture the rental
reductions oﬀered to these tenants.15 The relation between OALS and maturity may also
have something do do with our use of only a single interest rate, the 10 year rate, as a proxy
for the entire term structure in our analysis. Overall, however, the regression explains little
of the variance in the leases’ OALS, so the vast majority of the variability in OALS is due
not to misspeciﬁcation (which would show up as a systematic mispricing, correlated with
observable factors) but rather to either unobservable explanatory variables or to (random)
mispricings.
As a further visual diagnostic check of possible missing factors in the lease valuation
model, we looked at plots of OALS by area and property type against various possible
explanatory variables. Figure 5 is one example, showing retail leases in Orange, California,
but these plots are representative of the results for other areas and property types. The
additional factors we consider in these plots include lease maturity, lease origination date,
the short term Treasury rate, and the net square footage of the leased property. As is clear
from the plots, there is no discernible relation between these factors and the magnitude of the
OALS. The model is doing a good job of picking up almost all of the explainable variation in
lease values, though the dispersion of the OALS values suggests that random pricing errors
or unobservable factors are also an important feature of lease contracting in these markets.
Finally, Table 5 presents the results of a regression of ex post realized rent (the rent on
September 9, 1997) on the same set of lease contract and tenant characteristics. This reduced
form speciﬁcation is very common in the empirical lease literature, although in our case it is
again a ﬁxed eﬀects model by property.16 As previously discussed, an important limitation
with reduced form regressions of this type is the joint determination of the lease rate and
other lease contract terms at the origination of the lease. Since the reduced form regression
does not properly account for all the lease contract terms, the reported results cannot be
interpreted as oﬀering any causal explanations for observed lease rent rates. Instead, the
results are reported as a point of comparison with the structural modelling results.
As shown in columns three and four of Table 5, the length of the lease and lease contracts
with renewals at ﬁxed rates all have statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on the realized
rent. Credit worthy tenants, more contractual lease renewals, and the size of the leased
space all lead to statistically signiﬁcant reductions in the realized rents. The ﬁnding that the
occupancy rate and tenant improvement expenditures appear to have statistically signiﬁcant
15 This result is reminiscent of Schallheim et al. (1987), who ﬁnd that lease yields are a decreasing function
of asset size (among other variables). Crawford et al. (1981) also ﬁnd some evidence of a relation between
lease yields and asset size, though it is less conclusive.
16Again, we do not report the ﬁxed eﬀects parameters, although a χ2 test of joint insigniﬁcance was
rejected at the 1% level
15and negative eﬀects on realized rent levels is somewhat surprising. It is quite possible that
these variables proxy for soft leasing markets in which landlords chose to maintain occupancy
levels using low rent rates and other inducements such as tenant improvements.
It is interesting to contrast, the reduced form rental results with the results on the same
factors in the OALS regression. Since the OALS is obtained from our structural model
calibration, it accounts for the true economic value of leases through the combined eﬀects
of the drift and volatility of the spot lease rate, the embedded options, and the rent reset
structure of leases. Diﬀerent from the reduced form rental regression, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects
of the options, tenant credit worthiness, occupancy levels, and tenant improvements do not
have statistically signiﬁcant (at the .05 level or better) eﬀects on OALS. These results suggest
that the rental regression results for these eﬀects may be spurious due either to problems
of endogeneity or to the fact that the rental regressions only account for the initial rental
rate of the lease not its full proﬁle of rent rates and options throughout the life of the
lease. Another important diﬀerence between the two regressions is the realized rent reduced
form regression indicates that oﬃce and retail rents are statistically signiﬁcantly higher than
warehouse rent, whereas the OALS analysis says that the OALS for these property types are
on average higher, indicating a beneﬁt to tenants due to “lower” rents.
4 Conclusions
This paper develops a ﬂexible contingent claims lease valuation model, and estimates the
model using a data set giving detailed contract information on 711 leases from three property
types in 11 diﬀerent states. Unlike prior empirical studies, which regress a single period’s
lease payment on various explanatory right hand side variables, we analyze the behavior of
the NPVs of diﬀerent leases, estimated from the model. This has the advantage of allowing
us to handle, in a consistent framework, leases which diﬀer in their initial payments, how fast
the payments grow over time, their maturity, and what options there are to renew or cancel
the lease. We ﬁnd large pricing errors that cannot be explained using interest rates, lease
maturity, or information on the options embedded in the contracts, suggesting the presence
of signiﬁcant mispricing or unobservable factors in the market for real estate leases.
In addition to exploring the behavior of our model, we also propose a new measure
for comparing diﬀerent leases, the Option-Adjusted Lease Spread, or OALS. This measure
is an annualized version of the model’s estimate of the lease’s NPV, analogous to a bond’s
yield, an option’s implied volatility, or a mortgage-backed security’s Option-Adjusted Spread.
Like these measures, OALS allows leases with diﬀerent maturities and contract terms to
be compared on a consistent and maturity-independent basis. Since leases are the primary
16collateral for commercial mortgages, our proposed OALS measure is potentially an important
additional underwriting metric for commercial lenders and for investors in the commercial
mortgage-backed securities market.
17Variable Standard
Name Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Tenant and Age of Property 16.1800 8.298 1.000 41.000
Property Anchor Lease 0.059 0.236 0.000 1.000
Characteristics Appraised Property Value (000) $5,056.574 $3,657.392 $850.000 $21,400.000
National Credit Tenant 0.064 0.244 0.000 1.000
Regional Tenant 0.059 0.236 0.000 1.000
Local Tenant 0.877 0.328 0.000 1.000
Leased Square Footage (000) 3.858 10.636 .120 153.480
Occupancy Rate 0.966 0.043 0.820 1.00
Recently Renovated 0.189 0.392 0.000 1.000
Suburban Oﬃce 0.184 0.387 0.000 1.000
Retail Mall 0.451 0.500 0.000 1.000
Light Industrial 0.366 0.481 0.000 1.000
Lease Maturity 5.230 5.670 1.000 50.000
Characteristics Number of Lease Renewal Options 0.171 0.601 0.000 6.000
Lease Renewal at Market Rent 0.147 0.354 0.000 1.000
Lease Renewal at Fixed Rent 0.107 0.310 0.000 1.000
Percentage Rent Rate 0.002 0.010 0 0.080
Tenant Improvements psf 0.222 0.151 0 0.50
Realized Monthly Rent (9/97) $11.020 $5.129 $2.97 $30.00
Ten Year Treasury at Origination 0.061 0.001 0.055 0.081
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Properties and Leases
This table shows the summary statistics for the tenant, property, and lease characteristics
of 711 leases originated between 1987 and 1996.
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19Variable Standard
Name Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Slope (15-year lease rate minus 1 year lease rate) -8.388 9.975 6.959 -40.879
Number of ﬁnance and insurance establishments (000) 4.879 2.861 .700 10.500
Number of retail establishments (000) 12.210 7.702 1.800 27.600
CPI Growth (%) 0.600 0.254 -0.1 1.300
Unemployment rate (%) 4.47 0.951 3.400 6.900
Annual Average Household Consumption Expenditures ($ 000) 37.430 2.482 34.400 42.350
Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Metro-level Macroeconomic Indicators
This table shows the summary statistics for the slopes of the spot lease curves in each
metropolitan area (measured as the diﬀerence between the 15 year lease rate and the 1 year
lease rate) and macroeconomic indicators for the respective metropolitan areas. The macroe-
conomic indicators include the metro-level number of ﬁnance and insurance establishments
obtained from The 1997 Economic Census, U.S. Census Bureau, the metro-level number of
retail establishments obtained from The 1997 Economic Census, U.S. Census Bureau, the
metro-level CPI growth in September, 1997 obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U.S. Department of Labor, the metro-level unemployment rate in May, 1997 (September,
1997 statistics are not available) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department
of Labor, the metro-level annual average household expenditures from the 1997 Consumer
Expenditure Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.
20Coeﬃcient Std. Error
Intercept -87.42* (43.164)
Finance and Insurance Establishments 4.162 (4.189)
Retail Establishments -1.305 (1.550)
CPI Growth -6.938 (9.421)
Unemployment Rate -5.352* (2.833)
Annual Average Household Consumption Expenditures 1.261 (0.998)
Warehouse 10.119 (7.448)
Retail 8.518 (6.831)
Adjusted R2 .03
F Statistic 1.07
N 21
** .05 level of statistical signiﬁcance
* .10 level of statistical signiﬁcance
Table 4: Determinants of the Slope of the Spot Lease Curve (9/97)
This table reports a regression of the slopes of the spot lease curves in each metropolitan
area (measured as the diﬀerence between the 15 year lease rate and the 1 year lease rate)
on macroeconomic indicators for the respective metropolitan area. The macroeconomic
indicators include the metro-level number of ﬁnance and insurance establishments in the 1997
Economic Census, U.S. Census Bureau; the metro-level number of retail establishments in
the 1997 Economic Census, U.S. Census Bureau; the metro-level CPI growth in September,
1997; the metro-level unemployment rate in May, 1997 (September, 1997 statistics are not
available) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau; the metro-level annual
average household expenditures from the 1997 Consumer Expenditure Survey, U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
21OALS (psf) Realized Rent (9/97)(psf)
Coeﬃcient Std. Error Coeﬃcient Std. Error
Intercept -521.598* (233.901) 71.256** (9.433)
Age of Property 0.229 (1.972) 0.073 (0.080)
Anchor Lease -2.253 (11.952) -0.973* (0.482)
National Credit Tenant -4.979 (11.649) 0.261 (0.469)
Local Tenant -5.319 (9.066) 0.060 (0.365)
Leased Square Footage -2.399** (0.589) -0.218** (0.024)
Sq. Leased Square Footage -0.011** (0.004) 0.001** (0.0002)
Lease Maturity -2.292** (.589) 0.144** (0.030)
Number of Lease Renewal Options 10.591 (8.362) -1.606** (0.335)
Lease Renewal at Market Rent -13.922 (8.013) 0.409 (0.323)
Lease Renewal at Fixed Rent -15.919 (14.871) 1.917** (0.600)
Percentage Lease Rate -22.098 (12.213) 20.812 (11.492)
Property Occupancy Rate 445.221 (247.041) -56.640** (8.955)
Property Recently Renovated 28.339 (28.638) -1.775 (1.155)
Property Suburban Oﬃce 62.768 (54.705) 9.820** (1.091)
Property Retail Mall 30.439 (42.469) 3.715* (1.712)
Tenant Improvements 392.838 (201.439) -30.568** (8.124)
Adjusted R2 .098 .828
F Statistic 2.46** 65.53***
N 711 711
∗∗ .01 level of statistical signiﬁcance
∗ .05 level of statistical signiﬁcance
Table 5: Determinants of OALS and Realized Rental Rate (9/97)
This table shows the results of running a ﬁxed eﬀects regression model on the OALS and on
the realized rent observed in September, 1997.
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Figure 1: Examples of lease contracts – Phoenix light industrial
Each line corresponds to a single lease on light industrial property in Phoenix, AR, and
shows the scheduled monthly lease payment per square foot (psf) for each month after the
initiation date of the lease. The varying lease start dates run from 1990 through 1998.
23Spot Lease Curve: Light Industrial
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Figure 2: Term Structure of Lease Rates: Industrial
This graph shows the estimated term structure of lease rates for light industrial property in
various cities, using the parameter estimates shown in Table 2. The ﬁxed lease payment for
a lease with maturity T years (as a multiple of the instantaneous lease rate, x) is calculated
from Equation 14,
d
x
=

r
r + λ − µx

1 − e−{(r+λ)−µx}T
1 − e−rT

.
24Spot Lease Curve: Suburban Office
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Figure 3: Term Structure of Lease Rates: Oﬃce
This graph shows the estimated term structure of lease rates for oﬃce property in various
cities, using the parameter estimates shown in Table 2. The ﬁxed lease payment for a lease
with maturity T years (as a multiple of the instantaneous lease rate, x) is calculated from
Equation 14,
d
x
=

r
r + λ − µx

1 − e−{(r+λ)−µx}T
1 − e−rT

.
25Spot Lease Rate Curve: Retail
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Figure 4: Term Structure of Lease Rates: Retail
This graph shows the estimated term structure of lease rates for retail property in various
cities, using the parameter estimates shown in Table 2. The ﬁxed lease payment for a lease
with maturity T years (as a multiple of the instantaneous lease rate, x) is calculated from
Equation 14,
d
x
=

r
r + λ − µx

1 − e−{(r+λ)−µx}T
1 − e−rT

.
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Figure 5: Option-Adjusted Lease Spread for retail leases in Orange County
This ﬁgure plots the OALS for each retail lease in Orange County (calculated using the
parameter estimates shown in Table 2) against possible explanatory variables. Panel a. plots
the OALS against the start date of the lease, panel b. plots OALS against the interest rate
on the lease’s start date, panel c. plots OALS against the initial length of the lease contract,
and panel d. plots OALS against the log of the area leased.
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